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A comparison ofregional dairy cooperatives with investor-owned dairy firms for the period
1976-87 produced empirical findings thatare atvariance with the hypotheses suggested by the
theoryofcooperatives. Thecooperatives in the sample performed significantly betterthan the
IOFs when compared by leverage, liquidity, asset turnover, and coverage ratios, while the rate
ofreturn to equity was not found to be significantly different. Techniques are also proposed
for valuing the nonmarket aspects of cooperatives that are not captured by financial ratio
analysis.
Cooperatives are regarded as a separate form ofbusiness organization, extending
the conventional classification ofsingle proprietorships, partnerships, and stockhold-
er-owned firms. like other firms, cooperatives buy, sell, and produce goods and
services. However, unlike other firms, cooperatives are owned by their member
patronsandexisttoservetheirmembers; theydistributeprofitsorsurplusesaccording
to patronage and not according to investment. In addition to their business activity,
cooperativesalso provide goods andservices forwhich nomarketvalues areavailable:
they are active in community development, member education, and government
lobbyingonbehalfofmembersandareoftenregardedas providinga trainingground
for participatory management and democratic governance. The specific features
of the cooperative form of organization are sufficiently distinctive to suggest that
cooperatives may pursue different objectives from investor-owned firms (IOFs).
According to a survey performed by Purdue University in the late 1970s and early
1980s (Schrader etal.), polieymakers and university economists were reported to feel
that there were significant differences between thegoals ofcooperatives and investor-
ownedfirms andthatthesedifferences ingoals causeddifferencesinbusinessstrategy.
On the otherhand, as partofthe same survey, Babb and Lang found that managers
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ofcooperatives and proprietaryfinns ranked theirgoals essentially thesame. Perhaps
this difference in opinion is due to the absence of generally accepted perfonnance
criteria for cooperatives, which may be caused by disagreements over the role or
function ofcooperatives in society.
Inordertocapturepossibleeconomicdifferencesbetweenthetwo fonnsofbusiness
organization, this paper compares the financial perfonnance of cooperative and
investor-owned dairies, usingperfonnancemeasures thatareconventionallyaccepted
for investor-owned finns. Yet it is recognized thatcompleteevaluation ofcooperative
perfonnance requires consideration of the nonmarket dimensions ofcooperatives.
These dimensions are not captured by conventional economic analysis based on
financial perfonnance measures and are only discussed in conceptual tenns in this
paper.
Thepaperis organizedas follows. Thefirst section presentsa theoretical framework
for comparative performanceanalysis ofcooperatives and investor-owned finns. The
next section compares the performance of dairy cooperatives and investor-owned
dairy manufacturers from 1971 to 1987, using financial ratio analysis. Nonmarket
dimensions ofcooperative performance are identified in the following section, along
with methods thatcould beapplied to theirevaluation. Concludingremarks are given
in the final section.
Theoretical Basis for the Comparison of Cooperatives and
IOFs
Cooperatives are a fonn ofcollective action in which individualsjoin together to
accomplish what would be morecostly orimpossible to achieve individually (Zusman).
Farmersandothersmall operators, for example, have formed cooperativesto amelio-
rate theirdisadvantagein themarketsystem. Yeteconomistsand managers frequently
view cooperatives simply as a variantofan investor-owned finn, modeling them with
an objective function that reflects the specific features of cooperative organization
(Staatz 1989). For example, an appropriate objective function of a cooperative, as
originally suggested by Enke, may be to maximize the sum of producer surplus
(profits) and consumer surplus (lower prices). Cooperatives also have been modeled
as having a zero- profitobjective and as maximizing average perunit surplus or price
received by members (Helmberger and Hoos).
Althoughconceptualframeworks foramorecomprehensiveanalysisofcooperative
performance are suggested in a later section, cooperatives are initially viewed as a
variant ofinvestor-owned firms. In this setting, cooperatives and IOFs can be com-
paredusingstandardtechniquesoffinancial performanceevaluation, suchas financial
ratio analysis. Financial ratios reflect the effect ofcorporate strategic decisions. The
theoryofcooperatives and the accepted views ofcooperativebehavior suggest funda-
mentaldifferencesofbusiness strategy thatmay resultin differencesoffinancial ratios
betweencooperativesand10Fs. Five financial ratiosthathavea directlinktocorporate
objectives and thus can be expected to reveal differences between cooperatives and
IOFs were selected for this study: these five ratios measure profitability, leverage,
solvency, liquidity, and efficiency.
Profitability is usually measured by the rate of return to investors' equity. An IOF
whose overall objective is maximization ofthe value ofthe firm will strive to maximize
the rate ofreturn to equity at a given risk level (Copeland and Weston). Cooperatives,
on the otherhand, are seldom regarded as rate-of-return maximizers and are gener-Comparative Performance/Parliament, Lerman, and Fulton 3
ally expected to have a lower rate of return than comparable IOFs for at least two
reasons.
First, following Helmberger and Hoos, cooperatives have often been modeled as
having a zero-profit o1:?jective, with prices and charges adjusted so that no surplus is
generated. Thisassumption will be reflected as a zero rate ofreturn to equity, which,
while highly undesirablefor IOFs, should notbe particularly harmfultocooperatives:
the members ofa zero-profit cooperative receive their payoffin the form ofhigher
product prices or lower costs.
Second, although shareholders in an investor-owned firm expect to earn a rate of
return on their investment, cooperative members mainly expect to receive benefits
through services provided by the cooperative, such as lower input prices or better
marketing channels. Members rely on being able to get back their investment after a
certain number ofyears through equity redemption schemes (Cobia et al.) and do
not necessarily expect to earn a rate of return on their investment.
Leverage is a measureofoutside financing that the firm raises in addition to owners'
equity capital. Specifically it canbecalculated as theratioofdebtto equity in the firm's
capital structure. The higher the leverage ratio, the greater are the risks associated
with the probability ofdefault by the firm, while lower leverage generally indicates
greaterfinancial security. Value-maximization theorysuggests theexistenceofoptimal
leverage for a firm (Copeland and Weston), which is determined by the trade-offs
between the benefits ofborrowing (e.g., the tax shield on interest) and the associated
risks (e.g., bankruptcy).
Corporategrowthin mostcases cannotbeentirely sustainedby internally generated
funds and requires external financing. IOFs distribute their financing needs between
raising new debtandissuing newequityso as to maintaintheoptimal"target"leverage.
Cooperatives, on the other hand, are viewed as "equity bound": they do not issue
commonstock to nonmembersandtheirmainsourceofequity, inaddition to retained
earnings, is direct infusion by members, which is usually small. Royer reports direct
contributions by members account for less than 15 percent of the increase in the
equity base ofthe 100 largest cooperatives from 1980-84. The unwillingness of the
members to invest equity funds in the cooperative may be attributable to lack of
secondary markets for cooperative stock (Staatz 1989). Cooperatives are accordingly
expected to rely more heavily on debt financing than IOFs in order to sustain
comparable growth rates.
A second reason to expect cooperatives to be more leveraged than IOFs is their
susceptibility to moral hazard behavior due to the cooperative principle of "risk
sharing" and mutual responsibility (Zusman). Cooperatives may act as ifthe coopera-
tive principles providean"insurancepolicy" in caseofadversebusinessoutcomes, with
strongcooperativesexpected tobailouttheir"failingfellow-cooperatives." Evidenceof
thesenseofmutualresponsibility in cooperatives is providedby a studyofcooperative
reorganizations: ParliamentandTaittfound thatmorethan 70 percentofcooperative
mergers in Minnesota in 1979-84 involved a partnerin a net loss position, compared
with only 6 percent of IOF mergers in the study by Ravenscraft and Scherer. This
suggests that cooperative mergers may have been treated as an alternative to bank-
ruptcy. As a result, cooperative decisionmakers may be influenced by moral hazard
and thus be willing to assume higher risk than the managers of"uninsured" investor-
owned firms. Thisrationale translatesinto potentially higherleverage for cooperatives
than for IOFs.
Solvency measures a firm's capacity to service debt. It is usually calculated as the
ratio of earnings before interest and tax (EBIT) to annual interest expense. When4 JOURNAL OF AGRICULTURAL COOPERATION 1990
Table I.-Expected Relationships between Financial Ratio Measures of
Performance for Cooperatives and Investor-Owned Firms
Performance Expected
Criteria Ratio Definition Relationship
Profitability Rate of return to equity Profit before taxa Co-op<IOF
Net worthb
Leverage Debt to equity Total liabilities Co-op>IOF
Net worthb
Solvency Coverage ratio EBIT Co-op<IOF
Interest
Liquidity Quick ratio Cash + Receivables Co-op<IOF
Current liabilities
Efficiency Asset turnover Sales Co-op<IOF
Total assets
aThis definition is used in order to ensure consistency with the available database for IOFs. The use of the before-tax rate of
return to equity may bejustified forthe purposesofthe presentcomparison because ofpossible differences in tax treatment between
cooperatives and IOFs.
bThe net worth of the dairy cooperatives is the total equity as reported in their financial statements.
this coverage ratio is high, there is little likelihood of defaulting on debt service
payments and the prospectofbankruptcy is remote. Value-maximizing IOFs attempt
to reduce the bankruptcy risk, and this is reflected in relatively high coverage ratios.
Cooperatives, on the other hand, can be expected to have lower coverage ratios: first,
their debt levels are expected to be relatively high, with a corresponding increase in
the annual interest expense; second, ifcooperatives operate with a zero-profit objec-
tive, they will tend to have a relatively low EBIT and herice a low coverage ratio;
third, moral hazard considerations suggest that cooperative managers may notattach
as much significance as IOF managers to default risk reduction.
Liquidity measures the adequacy ofcurrent assets to meet current obligations. The
most stringent measure ofliquidity is the quick ratio, which is the ratio ofthe firm's
liquid assets-eash and receivables-to current liabilities. Since high liquidity is a
conservative stance intended to protect the firm against the risk of defaulting on
current obligations, moral hazard behavior may induce the cooperatives to accept
lower liquidity than in IOFs.
Efficieru:y can be measured by the ratio of sales to total assets. It indicates how
efficiently the organization employs its assets to generate sales. Again, moral hazard
considerations suggest that cooperatives may be less discriminating in undertaking
investments than IOFs. As a result, cooperatives may have a tendency to "overinvest"
and their asset base may thus be greater than the asset base of IOFs for the same
level ofsales. This "overinvestment" should result in lower sales-to-total-assets ratios
for cooperatives than for IOFs.
The previous discussion suggests specific hypotheses concerning the expected
relative values ofthe five financial ratios for cooperatives and IOFs, which provide a
basis for a comparative performance analysis. Table 1 presents the definitions ofthe
financial ratios used in this studyand the expected relationship between the ratios for
cooperatives and IOFs.Comparative Performance/Parliament, Lerman, and Fulton




Financial ratio values areindustry-specific, andthecomparativeanalysis ofcoopera-
tives and IOFs in this paper is restricted to the dairy industry. The financial ratios of
cooperatives were calculated using financial statements collected from nine U.S.
regional dairy cooperatives for the period 1971 to 1987. The comparable ratios for
IOFs were obtained from the Dairy Product Manufacturers category as reported in
Robert Morris Associates Annual Statement Studies (RMA). The numberofIOFs in the
RMA studies for the corresponding years varied from 75 to 160. The dairy coopera-
tives in the sample had up to $100 million in assets, matching the asset size category
oftheinvestor-owneddairiesintheRMAstudies. ThedairyIOFsandthecooperatives
were also comparable with respect to the scope ofoperations. Both the cooperatives
and the IOFs process fluid milk for wholesale or retail distribution and manufacture
value-added dairy products, such as butter, cheese, ice cream, and yogurt.
The only statistics published by RMA for the IOF financial ratios are the median
andthetopandbottomquartiles. Accordingly, for thefinancial performancecompari-
sons, the median and the interquartile range of each financial ratio of the dairy
cooperatives were compared with the corresponding statistics of the same financial
ratio for IOFs. The top (bottom) quartile is such that the ratio values for 25 percent
of the sample firms are higher (lower) than the quartile value. The interquartile
range, accordingly, contains 50 percentofthe observed ratio values in the sample of
firms.
The time-series comparisons of cooperatives and IOFs for each of the selected
ratios are presented in graphical form. Figure 1(panels a throughe) plots the median
financial ratios ofthe dairy cooperatives and superimposes the interquartile rangeof
the cooperatives on the interquartile range ofthe IOFs for each financial ratio. The
profitability, leverage, and liquidity ratios for IOFs were available for the full period
1971-87, while coverage and sales-to-total-assets ratios were not published by RMA
before 1976. The detailed values of the median ratios and the interquartile ranges
are given in the Appendix.
The Wilcoxon rank-sum test was run on the time series of the median financial
ratios to detect significant differences between dairy cooperatives and IOFs. The test
results are presented in table 2. The null hypothesis was that the median financial
ratios are the same for cooperatives and IOFs. Thetest ranks the pooledobservations
ofthe two samples (the medianfinancial ratios ofcooperatives and IOFsin this study)
and forms the sumsofthe ranks for the two samples. Ifthe rank sums, orthe average
scores, of the corresponding ratios for cooperatives and IOFs are sufficiently close,
then the null hypothesis cannot be rejected. Ifthe rank sums, or the average scores,
are sufficiently different for the two samples, the test rejects the null hypothesis and
establishes, with a certain probability, that cooperatives and IOFs have different
medianfinancial ratios. Thedirectionofthedifferencebetweenthetwosamples, given
the meaningofthefinancial ratios, indicates whetherthecorrespondingfinancial ratio
is "better" or "worse" for cooperatives than for IOFs.
Profitability (Panel a)
Theinterquartile rangefor cooperatives lies within theinterquartile range for IOFs
in mostofthe years, and the median profitability ratio for cooperatives lies within the6 JOURNAL OF AGRICULTURAL COOPERATION 1990
Figure I.-Selected Financial Ratios for Dairy Cooperatives and Investor-
Owned Firms
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middle 50 percent of the IOFs for 15 of the 17 years. The Wilcoxon test indicates
that the median profitability ofcooperatives is significantly higher than the median
profitability ofIOFs over the entire period 1971-87. However, the profitability ratio
ofcooperatives shows a declining trend, and in recent years (1976-87) the median
profitabilities ofcooperatives and IOFs are not found to be significantly different by
the Wilcoxon test (table 2). The decline in the median rates ofreturn may be due to
accumulation ofequity by the dairy cooperatives and not to the decline in the level
ofearnings: theequitybaseofthecooperatives in thesampleincreased between 1971-
87 at an annual average rate of 14.7 percent as compared with only 7.6 percent for
the IOFs.
These findings do not support the hypothesis that cooperatives are less profitable
thanthe IOFs. Althoughtheirobjectivemaynotbetomaximize returnonequity, these
results indicate that, contrary to expectations, dairy cooperatives perform similarly to
dairy IOFs with respect to this profitability measure.
Leverage (Panel b)
The median leverage ratio of the dairy cooperatives lies within the middle 50
percent of the leverage ratios for IOFs in most years. The Wilcoxon test indicates
that, contrary to the hypothesis, there is nosignificant difference between the median
leverage of cooperatives and IOFs over the entire period 1971-87. However, the
median leverage of the dairy cooperatives has improved over the years, and in the
recent years (1976-87) it has been significantly better (lower) than that for the IOFsComparative Performance/Parliament, Lerman, and Fulton




Ratio Co-ops IOFs Z-statistic Prob>IZla
1976-87
Return to equity 14.0 11.0 1.01 0.31
Debt to equity 7.8 17.3 -3.27 0.00
Sales to assets 18.3 6.7 4.02 0.00
EBIT to interest 18.5 6.5 4.13 0.00
Quick ratio 18.2 6.8 4.04 0.00
1971-87
Return to equity 21.6 13.5 2.38 0.02
Debt to equity 16.9 18.1 -0.31 0.75
Quick ratio 25.6 9.4 4.89 0.00
aThe probability that the Z-statistic exceeds the observed value under the null hypothesis that the median financial ratios for
co·ops and IOFs are equal.
(table 2). Thevariability ofthe leverage ratio amongthe cooperatives also diminished
over the years, as is evident from the relatively wide interquartile range only in the
early years (1971-75).
The initial hypothesis suggesting that the cooperatives would be more leveraged
than the IOFs was based on equity undercapitalization and moral hazard behavior.
Theempirical findings refute the original hypothesis. As previously noted, theequity
base for the cooperatives increased during 1971-87 faster than for IOFs. Moreover,
the equity growth rate for the cooperatives (14.7%) was higher than the growth rate
of the total assets for the cooperatives (11.6%). Thus cooperative growth was not
restricted by a shortage ofequity and, in this respect, it is hard to view cooperatives
as "equity bound." More detailed analysis ofthe composition ofdebt in cooperatives
shows thatthey havegenerally very little long-termdebtanda numberofcooperatives
in the sample had no long-term debt at all in some of the years. It would appear
that the borrowing decisions of cooperatives are quite conservative and the dairy
cooperatives are not burdened with higher debt levels than the dairy IOFs.
Liquidity (Panel c)
For most years, the interquartile range ofthe quick ratio for the cooperatives lies
within the interquartile range for IOFs. The median quick ratio for cooperatives is
consistently near I, and the Wilcoxon test indicates that it is significantly higher than
the median quick ratio for IOFs. Dairy cooperatives thus appear to maintain at least
as high a liquidity as dairy IOFs.
Solvency (Panel d)
The mediancoverage ratio for cooperatives lies above the upperquartile for IOFs.
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is significantly higher than that for IOFs. The results provide evidence that coopera-
tives are more able than IOFs to meet annual interest payments.
Efficiency (Panel e)
The median sales-to-total-assets ratio ofcooperatives is shown by the Wilcoxon test
to be significantly higher than that for IOFs. In fact, the median efficiency ratio for
cooperatives consistently straddles the top quartile ofthis ratio for IOFs. Thus, the
dairy cooperatives appearto utilize their assets to generate sales more efficiently than
IOFs.
Onepossible explanationofthe highersales-to-total-assets ratioofthecooperatives
is that a greater proportion of cooperative sales consists of fluid milk sales, not
processed products. To check the possibility of a high proportion of pass-through
sales, the inventory turnover ofthe cooperatives, as measured by the ratio ofcost of
goods sold to inventory, was compared with thatofthe IOFs (figure 2). Prior to 1979,
the cooperatives hada substantially higher median inventory turnoverthan the IOFs,
indicating a possibility of a higher proportion of pass-through sales. The median
inventory turnoverofthe cooperatives, however, has declined substantially, andsince
1979 it has been very close to the IOF median. This development suggests that
cooperatives have moved away from pass-through milk sales and into value-added
processing. Because the inventory turnoverofcooperatives consistently lies within the
interquartile rangeofthe IOFsafter 1979, the highermediansales-to-total-assets ratio
for the cooperatives cannotbeentirelyattributed tothehandlingofa large proportion
of low-value-added fluid milk. Given the similarity in inventory turnover ratios inComparative Performance/Parliament, Lerman, and Fulton 11
recent years, the significantly highersales-to-total-assets ratios ofcooperatives indicate
that the cooperatives do not have redundant or underutilized assets, which refutes
the "overinvestment" hypothesis.
Summary ofFinancial Ratio Analysis
The results ofthis study indicate that over the 12-year period 1976-87 the median
performance ofcooperatives was significantly better than the median performance
of IOFs in terms of leverage, coverage, liquidity, and efficiency and not worse in
terms ofprofitability. Incontrast, Schraderetal. did notdetect significant differences
between"small"cooperatives and investor-owned firms usingthe same financial ratios
for profitability, efficiency, and leverage. Inanotherstudy, Chenobserved substantial
differences in leverageand profitability betweencooperatives and IOFs, but, contrary
to the findings of this study, he found leverage to be higher for cooperatives and
return on net worth lower, consistent with the original hypotheses (table 1).
The differing results among these studies ofcooperatives and IOFs may be due to
differences in methodology, industries analyzed, and asset size ofthe sample firms.
Schrader et al. used cross-sectional data of cheese plants, whereas this study uses
time-series data of dairy operations. Chen used a diversified sample of 79 "large"
agribusiness firms in five different industry groups, while the cooperatives and IOFs
in this study were all from the same industry with a mix ofasset sizes under $100
million. The difference in findings between this study and Chen cannot be fully
explained by size effects, as an analysis ofthe subset offive dairy cooperatives with
between $10 million and $50 million in assets did not produce results different from
those reported for the entire sample. Thus, for the dairycooperatives and IOFs with
under $100 million in assets there is no evidence that performance varies across asset
size categories. Future research using cooperatives and IOFs oflarger asset sizes and
in other industries may reveal that comparative performance varies across size and
industry categories.
Alternative Perfonnance Criteria for Cooperatives
As mentioned previously, cooperatives and IOFs are generally viewed as different
in a numberofnonfinancial dimensions, and performanceevaluationofcooperatives
should not be limited to financial comparisons with IOFs. Cooperatives, in particular,
are often thought ofas providing a public good. Oneofthe roles cooperatives play,
as suggested by Nourse, is that of competitive yardstick: cooperatives should add
enough competition to the system to give farmers a basis upon which to judge the
terms offered by investor-owned firms. Staatz (1987, p. 97) notes that:
Farmers, faced with unsatisfactory performanceby 10Fs, may form a coop-
erative firm whose purpose is to force the IOFs, through competition, to
improve their service to farmers. Ifsuccessful in enforcingcompetition, the
cooperative generatesbenefits thatit does notcaptureitselfbutwhich accrue
to the farmer-stockholders, as well as to other farmers in the area.
Otherpublic good aspects ofcooperatives include their ability to correctfor market
failures by providing services for which a functioning market does not exist and
theircommitmentto participatory managementand democratic governance. Specific
examples of the nonmarket services provided by dairy cooperatives in this study,
as identified in their annual reports, include the following: providing educational12 JOURNAL OF AGRICULTURAL COOPERATION 1990
programs for farmer members in areas ofmanagement and production, offering a
form ofinsurance through milk loss coverage for farm disasters, improving quality
control at the farm level through the use offield agents, promoting consumption of
milk and dairy products through programs on nutrition, interfacing between the
farmer members and state cooperative associations, and lobbying government.
Full evaluation ofcooperative performance requires methods capable ofvaluing
these nonmarket dimensions. Evaluation of nonmarket goods has received a great
deal ofconsideration in the area ofenvironmental and resource economics, where
the two general approaches ofevaluating nonmarket goods are: (1) inferring values
from observed behaviorand (2) survey-based direct elicitation. Both approaches lend
themselves to the evaluation ofnonmarket aspects ofcooperative performance.
With cooperatives viewed as a form ofcollective action, cooperative performance
can be measured by estimating the incremental value of the cooperative to the
members. An appropriate performance measure for an agricultural cooperative
could be the profitability ofthe members' farming operations with and without the
cooperative. For example, in the framework ofapproach (1) above, the incremental
value ofa marketing cooperative can be inferred from the differences in the prices
received by member producers from theircooperative and those received by produc-
ers dealing with comparable IOFs. This approach is conceptually similar to hedonic
pricing, a technique to value attributes for which no markets exist (see Nelson and
Brookshire et al. for the evaluation ofair pollution and airport noise).
Previous studies have looked at differences in prices between cooperatives and
IOFs. Babb determined that dairy cooperatives paid higher prices for milk than
IOFs. Additional Purdue University surveys looked at pricing differences between
cooperatives and IOFs in otherindustries (Schrader et al.). Although the differences
observed were not always significant, the cooperatives on average appeared to price
inputs lower and commodities higher than IOFs. These findings, however, were not
used to measure the incremental value ofcooperatives to their members.
Members andofficers may also be interested in the valuationofspecific cooperative
attributes, such as training in democratic control orinvolvement in community devel-
opment. This can be achieved by the survey-based direct elicitation methods, sug-
gested in approach (2) above, which includecontingentvaluation, contingentranking,
and factorial survey methods (Cummings, Brookshire, and Schulze; Mitchell and
Carson; Smith and Desvouges; Goodman). Application ofthese techniques to empiri-
cal evaluation ofcooperatives is a subject for future research.
Concluding Comments
Using standard financial ratio analysis, the performance ofdairy cooperatives was
found to be significantly better than the performance of dairy IOFs in terms of
leverage, liquidity, coverage, andefficiency ratios and notworse in termsofprofitabil-
ity over the period 1976-87. Even without allowing for benefits that are unique to
members of cooperatives and for potential public good aspects, the cooperatives
appear to meet or exceed generally accepted business standards, at least in the dairy
industry. Cooperatives, however, do have objectives that differ from those of IOFs.
Theseresults thereforeleadoneto ask questions such as: Hasthestandardoffinancial
analysis "forced" cooperatives to adopt the same goals as investor-owned firms? Has
the emphasis on efficiency and return on investment in the financial community had
a determining influence on the behavior of cooperatives?Comparative Performance/Parliament, Lerman, and Fulton 13
In order to evaluate performance on cooperative-specific objectives that are not
captured by financial ratio analysis, it is necessary to analyze nonmarket aspects of
cooperative behavior. Boynton and Babb examined some nonfinancial aspects of
cooperative performance, butthey reported qualitative information, such as whether
or not farmers perceived cooperatives as providing better service than IOFs, rather
than an estimate ofthe value ofcooperatives to farmers. The techniques suggested
in this paper, such as hedonic pricing and contingent valuation, can be used for
quantitative evaluationofnonmarketattributes ofcooperatives. Theexpandedevalu-
ation framework should improve ourunderstandingofthe performanceofcoopera-
tives and provide decisionmakers and policymakers with new tools for assessing
cooperative behavior.
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Appendix
Financial Ratios of Dairy Cooperatives and Investor-Owned Firms
(QI = Lower Quartile, Q3 = Upper Quartile)
PROFIT BEFORE TAX TO NET WORTH
Cooperatives Investor-Owned Firms
Year QI Median Q3 QI Median Q3
1971 10.2 19.6 25.9 5.1 14.4 27.1
1972 16.7 21.3 23.7 1.6 14.0 21.9
1973 12.9 21.9 27.4 0.8 14.9 21.6
1974 23.3 30.3 46.5 6.2 19.2 28.7
1975 26.2 31.2 41.8 9.9 17.1 29.6
1976 28.7 30.0 35.4 10.1 21.6 38.4
1977 22.3 27.9 39.6 10.3 16.8 30.4
1978 20.2 29.4 37.2 4.6 16.1 35.1
1979 13.5 21.5 26.2 6.2 15.1 31.2
1980 14.7 28.9 36.4 7.5 15.8 29.1
1981 8.2 19.1 25.6 5.7 17.8 32.1
1982 11.5 20.7 23.6 6.8 17.3 31.2
1983 11.7 14.3 16.7 6.1 16.5 31.4
1984 7.8 9.6 20.5 9.0 20.4 31.2
1985 9.9 14.3 29.4 8.6 15.8 29.8
1986 6.9 14.8 28.9 5.2 16.3 30.2
1987 12.3 18.2 25.5 8.1 17.1 31.8
TOTAL LIABILITIES TO NET WORTH
Cooperatives Investor-Owned Firms
Year Ql Median Q3 Ql Median Q3
1971 0.9 2.1 6.6 0.7 l.l 2.2
1972 0.9 2.4 6.8 0.7 1.3 2.5
1973 l.l 2.5 6.8 0.8 1.4 2.1
1974 1.1 2.0 5.4 0.8 1.5 2.7
1975 1.1 1.7 5.4 0.8 1.5 2.9
1976 1.1 1.4 2.2 0.9 1.5 3.4
1977 1.3 1.9 3.5 0.8 1/6 2.7
1978 1.4 1.5 3.6 1.0 1.7 3.2
1979 1.4 1.6 3.4 0.9 1.8 3.0
1980 1.3 1.6 3.9 1.0 2.0 3.5
1981 1.2 1.6 3.2 1.0 1.8 4.2
1982 1.1 1.4 2.9 1.0 1.8 3.7
1983 1.1 1.3 3.0 0.9 1.8 3.2
1984 1.0 1.5 2.6 1.2 2.0 4.1
1985 1.0 1.4 2.4 0.9 1.7 3.2
1986 1.1 1.3 2.7 0.9 2.0 3.4
1987 0.8 1.6 2.6 1.1 2.1 3.416 JOURNAL OF AGRICULTURAL COOPERATION 1990
CASH AND RECEIVABLES TO CURRENT LIABILITIES
Cooperatives Investor-Owned Firms
Year QI Median Q3 QI Median Q3
1971 1.0 l.l 1.3 0.5 0.9 1.2
1972 1.0 1.0 1.2 0.6 0.8 l.l
1973 1.0 1.0 1.2 0.4 0.8 1.2
1974 1.0 1.0 l.l 0.5 0.7 l.l
1975 0.9 1.0 1.2 0.6 0.8 1.2
1976 0.9 1.0 1.0 0.6 0.8 l.l
1977 0.9 0.9 1.0 0.5 0.9 1.2
1978 0.8 0.9 1.0 0.6 0.9 l.l
1979 0.8 0.8 0.9 0.6 0.8 1.0
1980 0.8 0.8 1.0 0.6 0.8 l.l
1981 0.8 0.9 1.0 05 0.8 l.l
1982 0.6 0.9 1.0 0.5 0.8 l.l
1983 0.8 0.9 1.0 0.6 0.8 l.l
1984 0.7 0.9 1.0 0.6 0.8 l.l
1985 0.8 1.0 l.l 0.5 0.8 l.l
1986 0.8 1.0 1.0 0.5 0.8 l.l
1987 0.8 0.9 1.0 0.5 0.8 l.l
SALES TO TOTAL ASSETS
Cooperatives Investor-Owned Firms
Year QI Median Q3 QI Median Q3
1976 4.3 5.2 7.1 2.8 3.7 4.5
1977 3.6 4.8 6.2 3.0 3.9 4.9
1978 3.8 4.7 6.3 2.9 4.0 4.9
1979 3.2 5.1 5.7 2.8 3.9 4.8
1980 2.9 4.8 5.9 27 3.7 4.8
1981 2.9 4.7 6.5 2.7 4.1 4.9
1982 3.0 4.6 4.9 3.2 4.3 5.4
1983 3.7 4.8 6.2 2.5 4.0 4.8
1984 3.4 4.6 6.2 2.9 4.0 5.0
1985 3.3 4.4 6.0 2.6 3.6 4.8
1986 2.9 4.1 6.2 2.6 3.5 4.6
1987 3.4 4.2 6.2 2.6 4.3 4.7
EBIT TO INTEREST EXPENSE
Cooperatives Investor-Owned Firms
Year QI Median Q3 QI Median Q3
1976 16.0 17.1 41.3 2.3 4.2 13.6
1977 3.7 20.4 44.1 2.7 4.5 12.8
1978 2.8 11.7 44.3 1.3 3.2 12.0
1979 1.5 10.7 20.8 1.6 2.9 5.7
1980 3.7 23.6 31.7 1.3 2.4 5.1
1981 2.5 6.9 20.7 l.l 2.2 4.7
1982 3.8 9.7 30.4 1.6 2.3 5.9
1983 3.1 6.2 47.0 1.6 2.8 5.7
1984 1.9 9.8 31.1 1.5 3.2 6.5
1985 4.1 18.8 66.4 1.5 2.9 5.1
1986 4.4 27.6 62.6 1.3 3.0 7.3
1987 1.2 18.8 52.6 1.6 2.8 6.1
Source: Cooperatives-calculated from the financial statements of nine regional U.S. dairy cooperatives with up to $100 million in
assets. Investor-Owned Firms-from Robert Morris Associates, AnnualStatement Studies, various years. Efficiency and coverage ratios
were not reported by Robert Morris Associates prior to 1976.